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fulfill "the preconditions of republican virtue." Indeed, "[w]hen 
sustaining republican virtue is the theme [of debate] the treatment 
[of those supporting adoption of the Constitution] is muted and sur-
prisingly incomplete." This bothers Lerner, but the justification, it 
seems to me, is quite plain: in a government intended to secure men 
in their natural rights, talk of inculcating virtue or molding man-
ners, morals, and beliefs grates upon the ears. So, too, does the 
word "regime" which Lerner uses repeatedly to describe America. 
In the tradition of political thought that term denied a separate 
sphere of private activity. 
It is not my purpose, however, to quarrel with Lerner over his 
desire to instill some virtue into the people and to borrow some of 
the attributes of a regime in doing it. What concerns me most is his 
attempt to draw the judiciary into what the framers considered to 
be the domain of the "political departments" of government, and to 
cite the most thoughtful framers in support of this project. That 
was not necessary to achieve Lerner's objective and will, I fear, mis-
educate his readers into believing that it is all right for judges to 
make policy in a good cause. 
My dispute with Lerner over the role of the Court should not 
obscure my admiration for this book. Lerner is well worth arguing 
with, and in the course of doing so I have furthered my own 
education. 
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CON-
STITUTION. By Morton White.t New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 273. $29.95. 
Eugene F. Miller 2 
Professor Morton White is the author or editor of more than a 
dozen books on philosophy and intellectual history, including The 
Philosophy of the American Revolution. In the present work, he 
seeks to carry forward his study of the American founding by ex-
tracting a philosophy from The Federalist. Professor White thinks 
of himself as a pioneer in this endeavor, because although various 
scholars have dealt with individual philosophical topics treated in 
The Federalist, "no other philosopher" has yet presented a synoptic 
view of its major philosophical ideas. 
I. Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. 
2. Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. 
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White emphasizes that The Federalist cannot be approached as 
if it were a philosophical text, since it was written mainly with the 
practical aim of securing ratification of the Constitution. He main-
tains, however, that the authors of The Federalist, whose collective 
pseudonym is "Publius," make frequent use of philosophical terms 
and statements. White proposes to discover what these terms and 
statements meant to Publius by subjecting them to logical analysis 
and also by explicating the philosophical texts from which Publius 
drew his meanings. 
This project is more problematic than it may sound. In select-
ing terms and statements for analysis, White disregards the fact that 
Publius's essays contain carefully structured arguments. Aside 
from what he says about No. 10 and No. 51, White makes no at-
tempt to reproduce those arguments or to view Publius's terms and 
statements in their contexts. The terms and statements themselves 
are selected in a way that is unsystematic and often arbitrary. Yet 
White moves confidently from his analysis of them to broad asser-
tions about Publius's implicit philosophy-his theory of knowledge, 
his ethics, his psychology, his theory of action, and his metaphysics. 
Rather than turning directly to the text of The Federalist, 
White begins by summarizing the views of John Locke and David 
Hume on the character of human knowledge. In his Introduction, 
White had promised to be attentive to "any philosophical text" 
which influenced Publius. Why then does the book focus almost 
exclusively on Locke and Hume? Locke is not mentioned at all by 
Publius, and Hume only once. Of course, White can show from 
other sources that Locke and Hume were read by the authors of 
The Federalist, but what of the other philosophers whom they read? 
White's choice of Locke and Hume as the philosophical pre-
cursors of The Federalist is guided more by his own predispositions 
than by any testimony of the authors of that work. As White pro-
ceeds, we discover that he is attempting to prove a very distinctive 
thesis about the philosophy of The Federalist. According to this 
thesis, Publius's theory of knowledge is marked by an inner tension 
or inconsistency, which shapes the major conclusions of The Fed-
eralist. Publius's moral principles are supposedly based on a ration-
alist epistemology, derived from Locke, while his principles of 
psychology and political science are based on an empiricist episte-
mology, derived from Hume. The Federalist thus appears to repre-
sent "a philosophical hybrid, an offspring of Lockean rationalism in 
morals and Humean empiricism in politics." It is White's determi-
nation to establish this thesis that leads him to focus almost exclu-
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sively on Locke and Hume as the philosophical sources of The 
Federalist. 
This thesis about the bifurcation in Publius's theory of knowl-
edge is crucial to White's overall interpretation of The Federalist, so 
it requires close scrutiny. To begin, White is probably correct in 
holding that Publius approached the study of politics along the lines 
of Hume's experimental method of reasoning. He should, however, 
have explored the possibility that Publius, like Hume, took the same 
approach to morals. White attributes to Hume a much sharper dis-
tinction than Hume himself made between "science" and ethics or 
morals. He is certainly wrong in suggesting that Hume "denied 
that ethics was an experimental science." 
White arbitrarily rules out the possibility that Publius followed 
Hume in deriving moral knowledge from experience. As he notes, 
Hume shared with other Scottish philosophers the view that moral 
knowledge is grounded on a peculiar sense of approbation or blame 
that we feel upon observing human conduct. White's thesis requires 
him to explore the possibility that the authors of The Federalist 
grounded morality the same way, especially since James Madison 
had studied Scottish moral philosophy at Princeton under John 
Witherspoon. Yet White simply assures the reader that there is "no 
hint" that Madison and the other authors of The Federalist sub-
scribed to the moral sense theory. We cannot tell if White has made 
the explorations that would be needed to justify this conclusion. 
Was Publius's approach to morals and natural law based on 
Lockean rationalism, as White maintains? We need to consider two 
questions: Does White depict Locke's moral philosophy accu-
rately? Is he able to show that Publius adopted a Lockean view of 
morals, as he has depicted it? I believe that both questions must be 
answered in the negative. 
White describes Locke's moral philosophy as if it were a kind 
of Christian Aristotelianism. We are told that Locke derived man's 
moral duties and rights from his God-given nature or essence, using 
abstract reason. Natural rights are strictly derivative from and 
subordinate to duties, since we have a right to do only that which it 
is our prior duty to do. White seems unaware of the view that 
Locke broke sharply with traditional natural-law teachings and fol-
lowed instead the approach of Hobbes, who treated man's natural 
rights as an extension of his strong desire for self-preservation and 
as a limitation on any duties that one might have to others.3 Locke 
3. For this interpretation of Locke, see Strauss, Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law, in 
WHAT IS POLffiCAL PHILOSOPHY? AND OTHER STUDIES (1959); see a/so Strauss, Natura/ 
Law, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA Of THE SociAL SciENCES 80 (D. Sills eel. 1968); 
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may not in fact have accepted the Hobbesian view of natural rights 
and natural law, but White never addresses this possibility or tells 
us why it should be ruled out. 
White's account of Lockean moral philosophy is correct on one 
important point: Locke does treat morals as a demonstrative sci-
ence, like mathematics, that rests on self-evident relations of ideas. 
White fails to see, however, that Locke is required, by the very epis-
temological principles that permit him to establish morals as a de-
monstrative science, to view moral principles in a way quite 
different from traditional writers. Lockean moral science can have 
a demonstrative character only because the "ideas" of which it con-
sists are "mixed modes," constructed freely by the mind without 
reference to real archetypes or standing patterns existing in nature. 
Thus, for example, we can understand the nature of "justice" and 
the other virtues simply by analyzing the ideas we hold of those 
things, since there is no real existence or being, beyond the ideas, 
that has to be taken into account. Traditional natural law theory 
had sought by reason or experience to find in nature a basis for the 
meaning of moral ideas, but the ideas that constitute Locke's moral 
science have no natural archetypes. 
White implies that "the essence of man" has the same status in 
Locke's moral philosophy as these other ideas. According to 
Locke, however, the idea of "man" falls under the heading of "sub-
stances" rather than mixed modes, which means that this idea is 
formed by reference to something external to the mind. The "es-
sence" of man is something more than the idea we form of man, so 
that propositions about the human essence cannot be true in a 
strictly analytic or self-evident way. This does not mean, however, 
that Locke accepts the traditional view that man's essence is intelli-
gible to the human understanding. According to Locke, the idea of 
"man" cannot truly represent the inner constitution or being that 
makes a man what he is, since "real essences" are completely un-
known to us. The idea of "man" can stand for nothing more than a 
"nominal essence," which our minds assemble from their experi-
ence of coexisting qualities. Locke even grants that the human es-
sence or species is variable, since people in fact form different ideas 
of "man." The species "man" is the workmanship of the under-
standing rather than of nature, and there is no natural or experi-
mental basis for settling disagreements as to what a true man is.4 
Coby, The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?, 49 REVIEW OF 
POLITICS 3 ( 1987). 
4. I have explored these features of Locke's epistemology in Locke on the Meaning of 
Political Language: The Teaching of The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 9 PoL. 
Sci. REVIEWER 163 (1979). 
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White's account of Lockean moral philosophy gives a mislead-
ing picture of both the method and the substance of Locke's natu-
ral-law teaching and blurs important differences between Locke and 
the Aristotelian tradition. Yet according to White, there is "no 
doubt" that Madison and Hamilton were influenced by Locke's 
epistemology of natural law, as thus described. White claims that 
Publius defined man's essence by a strictly a priori method and 
would not have appealed to experience. Reasoning from the attrib-
utes of this God-given essence, Publius supposedly derived man's 
duties to preserve his life, perfect his essence, and pursue happiness. 
These are also natural rights, "simply because the duty to perform 
an action implies the right to perform that action." 
White's book offers no substantial evidence that Publius actu-
ally understood natural duties and rights in this way. Having made 
this unsupported assumption, White proceeds to select out a few 
statements by the authors of The Federalist that relate in some 
vague way to Locke, but also to other political philosophers. These 
isolated statements are then put forward as proof that Publius was 
in full agreement with the so-called Lockean epistemology of natu-
ral law. 
White attempts to link Madison to the Lockean natural-law 
teaching by citing two brief passages from The Federalist and one 
from the 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance. In No. 43, Madison 
refers to "the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God." He 
is speaking in this context only of a law that governs societies, not 
individuals; the law in question encompasses "the great principle of 
self-preservation," which sounds more Hobbesian than traditional. 
Nevertheless, White leaps to the conclusion that Madison intends 
here to endorse not only the full body of self-evident truths of the 
Declaration of Independence, but also what he has described as "a 
Lockean moral philosophy of natural rights and natural duties." In 
No. 51, Madison speaks of "the state of nature" and of the danger 
there that leads the strong as well as the weak to seek the protection 
of government. This single reference makes it "especially evident" 
to White that Madison is endorsing the body of Locke's moral phi-
losophy, even though Madison says nothing in No. 51 about Locke 
or natural rights and natural laws. In his Memorial and Remon-
strance, Madison declares it to be "a fundamental and undeniable 
truth" that "[r]eligion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and 
the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence." White asserts that by "unde-
niable," Madison must have meant "self-evident," so that he must 
have shared Locke's view that Morality is a demonstrative science, 
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like mathematics.s Madison speaks here only of the right of reli-
gious freedom, and he traces this right to the impossibility of coerc-
ing opinions as well as to the duty that we owe to our Creator. Yet 
White takes this passage as evidence that the American colonists 
derived the full range of inalienable rights from our duty to God. 
Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, we are told, must have regarded 
statements about these rights not as empirical statements about 
men, but as "truths which could be axioms or theorems in a demon-
strable science of morality that Locke thought was constructible but 
never constructed." 
I have reviewed the full body of evidence, such as it is, that 
White offers for his conclusion that Madison was a "Lockean ra-
tionalist" in morals. As we have seen, it is doubtful that Locke 
himself adopted the method or the principles that White attributes 
to him. Yet White avers, on the basis of isolated references here 
and there to the state of nature, to the laws of nature, and to reli-
gious duties, that Madison must have followed the same method 
and held the same principles. 
Since White's argument applies broadly to "Publius" and not 
just to Madison, he must bring Jay and Hamilton under the um-
brella of Lockean rationalism. All that he gives us in Jay's case is a 
statement from The Federalist No. 2 to the effect that the people 
must cede some of their natural rights to government in order to 
vest it with requisite powers. On the surface at least, the evidence of 
Hamilton's moral rationalism is more compelling. In writings of 
1774-75, Hamilton employed the concepts of natural law and natu-
ral rights, and he observes that to deny the principles of natural law 
"will be not less absurd, than to deny the plainest axioms." This 
passage can be read as asserting only an analogy or parallel between 
mathematical and natural-law principles, but White takes it to 
mean that Hamilton accepted "Locke's theory that morality could 
become a demonstrative science." White finds further support for 
this claim in No. 31, but he badly distorts Hamilton's actual state-
ment. According to White, Hamilton asserts here that there are 
primary truths or first principles in morals, and that these moral or 
ethical statements-to quote Hamilton-"contain an internal evi-
dence, which antecedent to all reflection or combination commands 
5. White shows that Madison's argument for freedom of conscience closely parallels 
an argument by Francis Hutcheson, but he dismisses summarily the possibility that Madison 
could have adopted Hutcheson's doctrine or moral sense. I wonder, however, whether 
Madison used the term "undeniable" here to apply to the moral sense or to principles derived 
from this sense. In The Philosophy of the American Revolution, White himself grants that an 
"undeniable" truth need not be strictly self-evident, i.e., it may be deducted from self-evident 
principles. 
208 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:115 
the assent of the mind." What Hamilton actually says is that such 
primary truths or first principles are found "in disquisitions of every 
kind," not just in morals and geometry. He goes on, in fact, to 
mention politics specifically as one of the sciences that rest on pri-
mary truths or first principles. Hamilton is not saying here that 
morals or ethics is a demonstrative science like mathematics. He is 
suggesting instead that all sciences, including experimental sciences 
such as politics, are in a way analogous to geometry in having some 
first principles. Moreover, the examples that Hamilton gives here of 
first principles in ethics and politics have nothing to do with natural 
rights or natural law, but include such maxims as "there cannot be 
an effect without a cause" and "the means ought to be proportioned 
to the end." Hamilton's endorsement of the former maxim leads 
White to argue that Hamilton was not constant in his devotion to 
Hume. Yet Hume himself thought it proper for the moral or polit-
ical scientist to assume the truth of the principle of causality, even 
though this maxim is drawn into question by deeper and more skep-
tical reflections. 
White's account of the epistemology of The Federalist leads 
him to offer distinctive interpretations of that work on two impor-
tant points. The first concerns Publius's way of reconciling natural 
rights with the public interest. According to White, Publius re-
garded his statements about the natural rights of individuals as true 
in a self-evident or demonstrative way. They were meant to be 
tested by a logical analysis of man's essence and of the duties im-
posed on man by his Creator. Yet White interprets Publius's state-
ments about the interest, good, or happiness of the public as having 
an empirical or experimental foundation. Statements about the 
public interest are thus separated by an "epistemological gulf" from 
statements about the natural rights of the individual. Both kinds of 
statements are moral or ethical in character, but their truth is tested 
in different ways. 
I find this line of argument neither clear nor persuasive. Let us 
grant that a statement about an individual's natural rights is derived 
merely from reasoning about ideas. How would a statement about 
the public's interest be different? White seems on occasion to attri-
bute to Publius the view that the public good, happiness, or interest 
is itself "discernable empirically." This interpretation runs counter, 
however, to White's broader claim that Publius relied on reason 
alone to establish the meaning of moral terms. If the good or happi-
ness of the public can be discerned empirically, why could we not 
discern the individual's good or happiness in the same way? On 
other occasions, White seems to say that Publius relies on experi-
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ence merely to determine the means for attaining the public good or 
happiness, or else the degree to which it has been attained, rather 
than what that good or happiness is. If, for example, Publius were 
to say that the public is in a happy condition or that the public 
happiness is promoted by some law, he would intend these as em-
pirical statements which can be tested by observation. The problem 
with this argument is that parallel statements about the good or 
happiness of individuals would seem to be testable in the same way: 
for example, the statement that individuals are enjoying their natu-
ral rights or that such enjoyment is promoted by some law. Even 
granting that The Federalist has a hybrid epistemology, White has 
not established that its statements about the public good have a dif-
ferent foundation from its statements about the good of the 
individual. 
White insists, nevertheless, on interpreting Publius's state-
ments about natural rights and about the public good as if they were 
divided by an "epistemological gulf." According to White, 
Madison's and Hamilton's epistemology required them to elevate 
the protection of natural rights above the promotion of the public 
good, since statements about the former are always more certain 
than statements about the latter. White believes that Madison did 
in fact give priority to natural rights in most instances, but in one 
area-that of slavery-Madison was inconsistent. When his de-
fense of the Constitution forced him to choose between the slaves' 
right to liberty and the slaveholders' right to property, Madison 
chose to defend slavery by appealing to the public good: "To insist 
that the slaves be given their liberty, he seems to have said in reply, 
would violate the right of the American people to pursue happiness 
by avoiding the dismemberment of the Union, and therefore he ac-
cepted the continuation of slavery." In this case, at least, Madison 
was willing to put what was "politic" above what was honest or 
just. White contends that Hamilton was much more willing than 
Madison to disregard the implications of their epistemology and to 
subordinate the people's natural rights to energy and efficiency in 
government. 
The substantive issue raised by White's analysis is whether 
Madison and Hamilton thought that the individual's natural rights 
could in fact be in conflict with the public good, and whether in 
cases of such conflict they would have given priority to the latter. 
Clearly such conflicts can arise if the right to life and liberty is ina-
lienable-consider, for example, the case of the person drafted into 
military service or even the person punished for a crime. By and 
large, however, the authors of The Federalist thought that the pub-
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lie good requires the protection of individual rights, so that ener-
getic government serves the interests of the individual as well as 
those of the community. This point is stated clearly in a long pas-
sage that White quotes from No. 1, where Hamilton observes "that 
the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, 
in the contemplation of a sound and well informed judgment, their 
interest can never be separated." White detects "code words" in 
this passage which lead him to conclude that Hamilton was not seri-
ously interested in protecting the liberties that were central to the 
Revolution. This seems to be another instance, however, where 
White is guided by his preconceptions rather than by textual 
evidence. 
As for Madison's alleged inconsistency on the issue of slavery, 
it is true that he saw this institution as a violation of the natural 
rights of the slaves. It is also true that Madison regarded union as 
vital to the happiness of the American people, and that he was will-
ing to guarantee the protection of property in slaves in order to 
bring the southern states into the union. Yet this was not a simple 
case, as White would have it, in which individual rights were being 
sacrificed to the public good. Madison believed-correctly, I 
think-that union would serve the interests even of slaves, since the 
eventual abolition of slavery would be more likely with union than 
with the states divided into northern and southern confederacies. 
Of course, the politics of the struggle for ratification prevented him 
from saying so. 
White's interpretation of the epistemology of The Federalist 
leads him to a distinctive position also on the long-standing debate 
as to whether or not the principles of the Constitution are consistent 
with those of the Declaration of Independence. After the turn of 
the present century, many historians came to view the Constitution 
as an effort by a wealthy elite to curb the demand, flowing from the 
Revolution, for equality and democracy. More recently, other in-
terpreters, most notably Martin Diamond, have defended the Con-
stitution on democratic grounds and have denied that its principles 
are opposed in any fundamental way to those of the Declaration.6 
White incorporates elements of both views. On the one hand, he 
finds that The Federalist embodies the same epistemological and 
moral principles as the Declaration. White thus opposes, for exam-
ple, Gordon Wood's suggestion that the Constitution's defenders 
gave new and different meanings to the terms of the Declaration. 
Nevertheless, he accepts the old claim that the Constitution's de-
6. See Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' 
Intent, 53 AM. PoL SCI. REV. 52 (1959). 
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fenders were "aristocratic" or "elitist" in their view of politics. He 
thus reaches a distinctive conclusion about the relationship of The 
Federalist to the Declaration: They embody the same philosophical 
principles, but those common principles have elitist implications. 
This elitist potential remained latent during the Revolution, but it 
was activated in 1787-88 by such Federalists as Madison and 
Hamilton. 
In White's view, the Declaration and The Federalist are elitist 
in principle because they assume that men are not equal in their 
capacity to discern the truth about morals and politics. Once it is 
established that some are better able than others, because of their 
greater learning or their freedom from bias and passion, to see the 
self-evidence of moral truths or the soundness of experimental prin-
ciples in the science of politics, these superior reasoners can elevate 
themselves above the rest and become what Locke had called "dic-
tators of principles." White believes that these elitist assumptions 
find clear expression in Publius's teachings on politics. Political 
elitism "is blatantly present in The Federalist in spite of the many 
genuflections that are made in the direction of the people." Publius 
may sometimes seem to say that the people are capable of governing 
themselves, but White thinks that in these passages Publius simply 
flatters his readers and "plays to the gallery." White thus rejects 
Publius's own claim to be a friend of the people and a champion of 
republican government. 
In assessing this argument, we must note that White's various 
formulations of it partake of an inconstancy and imprecision that 
are not unusual in this book. In the most extreme formulations, 
Publius is said to have thought that the principles of morals and 
politics "could be perceived only by the few," or by "a special sort 
of person." If Publius had truly held such an exclusivist position, 
then the charge of political elitism might have some credibility. In 
other formulations, however, Publius's epistemology seems not to 
be elitist at all. Majority rule would hardly seem to be endangered 
by the view that "certain members of the community were better 
able ... to discover the truths of natural law than the majority of 
the people were," or that the discovery of truth in morals and poli-
tics "could require an expertise that not all men possessed." White 
shifts back and forth between these formulations, apparently una-
ware of the difference between saying, on the one hand, that truth 
can be perceived only by a few, and, on the other, that the few sur-
pass the many in perceiving the truth or that "not all" are able to 
perceive it. 
On one occasion, White quotes a lengthy passage from No. 63 
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in which Madison explains clearly how the judgments of the few 
and the many are to be related under the proposed Constitution. 
According to Madison, "the cool and deliberate sense of the com-
munity ought to in all governments, and actually will in all free 
governments ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers." Never-
theless, there will arise "particular moments in public affairs" when 
the people will be drawn or misled into calling "for measures which 
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn." It will be salutary "in these critical moments" for are-
spectable body of citizens, such as the proposed Senate, to check the 
progress of the measure "until reason, justice and truth, can regain 
their authority over the public mind." White takes these remarks as 
expressing an elitism or "parentalism," since the people have to be 
protected by a respectable body of citizens from the tyranny of their 
own passions. Yet Madison's words hardly support such an inter-
pretation. Madison is very clear that the senatorial checks on the 
popular will are only occasional and temporary. In a properly con-
stituted republic, the will of the people must prevail in the long run. 
Contrary to White's interpretation, Madison does count on the peo-
ple to understand their own rights and duties and to make sound 
judgments about the policies of government. 
White's comments suggest that he has given very little thought 
to the relationship of philosophy and democratic government. If it 
is undemocratic to say that some are more perceptive than others 
about natural rights or the public interest, or that not everyone can 
perceive these things adequately, then it is difficult to envision a 
defensible epistemology that would support democracy. Must a 
democrat assume that all persons understand politics equally well? 
Must he identify the truth with what the people finally embrace in 
the marketplace of ideas, so that no independent standpoint remains 
for judging the popular views? White calls into question the demo-
cratic credentials of the American founders, but he gives no indica-
tion of what a suitable epistemology for democratic government 
might be. 
I have focused on White's effort to extract a theory of knowl-
edge from The Federalist, but he discusses other philosophical 
themes as well. In sections on "psychology" and "theory of ac-
tion," he has some sensible things to say about Publius's account of 
human motives. He promises to treat "metaphysics" in one section 
of the work, but says nothing substantial about that topic, aside 
from some observations on causality. Although his thesis requires 
it, White does not bother to explore how Madison and Hamilton 
might have understood the being of nature, of God, and of man's 
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essence. He simply assumes that these writers must have shared the 
views that he attributes, with little evidence, to Locke. 
White devotes a section on "philosophy of history" to a refuta-
tion of Charles Beard's claim, in his earlier writings, that Madison 
was an economic determinist. In this context, White reviews 
Madison's account of the problem of faction and the "republican 
remedy" which the Constitution provides for this problem. White 
is able to show that economic motives were, for Madison, only one 
of the causes of factions. His account of the Madisonian solution to 
the problem of faction needs correction, however, on two points. 
First, Madison did not regard an expansion of a country's territory 
and population as sufficient in itself to produce the diversity re-
quired to check majority factions. The competing interests and 
ways of life would have to be multiplied through the encouragement 
of commerce. Publius thus advocated a large, commercial repub-
lic. 1 Second, White sometimes fails to distinguish between a "fac-
tion" and an interest group. At one point, he writes that "Madison 
wanted society to be divided into lots of factions because he wanted 
to prevent any one faction from becoming a majority of the people." 
A bit later, he writes that Madison wanted the republic to be "di-
vided into many interest groups that would check each other." 
White tends here and elsewhere to equate "interest groups" and 
"factions," even though, as he should know, a faction is an interest 
group that has become dangerous to others. As White himself ob-
serves at one point, a faction, for Madison, was bad by definition, 
since its members were actuated by an impulse adverse to the rights 
of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community. While Madison's policy was to multiply competing in-
terests, he certainly did not wish to multiply factions, as White 
suggests. 
Although White attempts to put The Federalist into philosoph-
ical context, he says virtually nothing about the context of debate in 
which the struggle for ratification of the Constitution occurred. 
The reader is thus likely to be puzzled by White's discussion of re-
marks by Hamilton on previous and subsequent amendments. 
Anti-Federalist strategy by early 1788 was to insist on previous or 
conditional amendments to the Constitution, which would have to 
be enacted before ratification could take place. The alternative 
which the Federalists pushed successfully was ratification first, with 
the promise that amendments would be considered subsequently by 
the new Congress. If White is aware of these strategic issues, he has 
7. See Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY Of POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 659 (L. 
Strauss & I. Cropsey eels. 1987). 
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nothing to say about them. In his initial discussion, he says, cor-
rectly, that Hamilton favored subsequent amendments, but later he 
contradicts this by observing that Hamilton wanted to demonstrate 
"the wisdom of 'previous' as opposed to 'subsequent' amendment of 
the Constitution." Here is but another illustration of a carelessness 
that is all too typical of this book. 
Despite its pretensions, or perhaps because of them, White's 
study fails to illuminate the text of The Federalist. He chides 
Madison and Hamilton for their "self-elevation," for thinking of 
themselves as superior to those who know less than they do. Yet 
this is exactly the posture that White assumes in relation to The 
Federalist. He approaches this text not with the openness of an in-
quirer who hopes to learn something, but with the dogmatist's con-
fidence that he knows, better than its authors, the philosophical 
assumptions on which their work is based. He imposes on The Fed-
eralist a simplistic epistemology that is unlikely to have been held 
either by Publius or by the philosophers on whom Publius is said to 
have relied. White's conclusions about Publius's moral philosophy 
are based on thin and often tortured evidence. He leaves the prob-
lem of Publius's "metaphysics" largely unexplored. For no good 
reason, he questions the genuineness of Publius's dedication to pop-
ular government. White says some worthwhile things on some top-
ics, but a carelessness of expression mars his study throughout. The 
idea of exploring the philosophical assumptions of The Federalist is 
a good one, but unfortunately this book has little to teach us on this 
subject. 
